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Mance: Former Government Lawyers

TOWARD A NEW ETHICAL
STANDARD REGULATING THE
PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (MCPR) in 1969 by the American Bar Association
(ABA), its ninth canon's admonition of avoiding the appearance
of impropriety has been used to regulate the private practice of
former government attorneys.l Because of the uncertainty of the
actual prohibitions of the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 9, the
federal common law on the disqualification of those attorneys is
in a state of confusion and the bar has been unable to adequately clarify the applicable code provisions for the courts and
members of the bar.1
In 1978 Congress identified conflict of interest situations for
former government lawyers by passing the Ethics in Government Act (the Act).8 The Act imposed criminal sanctions against
former government lawyers· and created the Office of Govern1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9, DR9-10I(B) (1981).
2. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en bane, 625 F.2d 433
(2d Cir. 1980) vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). See also Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1977); Note,
Firm Disqualification and the Former Government Attorney: Armstrong v. McAlpin, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 579 (1981); Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980).
3. Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) as amended, Pub. L. 96-019, 93 Stat. 37
codified in the following sequence: Title I-Amendments to 28 U.S.C. Special Prosecutor,
28 U.S.C. ch. 39, §§ 591-598; Title II-Congressional Legal Counsel, 2 U.S.C. ch. 9D, § 288;
Title III-Financial Disclosure, 5 U.S.C. ch. 18, §§ 701-709; Title IV-Office of Government
Ethics, 5 U.S.C. App. I, §§ 401-405; Title V-Restrictions on Post-Service Activities by
Officials and Employees of the Executive Branch, 18 U.S.C. ch. 11, § 207 and 28 U.S.C. §
528, Disqualification of officers and employees of the Department of Justice. See for
complete synopsis of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 701 n. Short Title.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. 1983).

433

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 4

434

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:433

ment Ethics ll to enforce a newly-drafted set of federal
regulations. II
This comment advocates the elimination of the "appearance
of· impropriety" as a legal and ethical standard governing the
disqualification of former government lawyers and urges the
ABA to adopt Rule LIP of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct. s Model Rule 1.11, Successive Government and
Private Employment, provides a comprehensible, precise ethical
rule regulating the post-government practice of lawyers in conformity with federal statute and regulation. s
II.

BACKGROUND

The "revolving door" is a derisive term used to describe the
practice of lawyers passing back and forth between government
service and private practice. to After a number of years with the
government, and having gained expertise. in a field, the revolving
door lawyer represents clients before the agency in which the
lawyer previously worked. l l Some revolving door lawyers begin
5. 5 U.S.C. App. I § 401 (Supp. 1983).
6. Regulations Concerning Past Employment Conflict of Interest, 5 C.F.R. § 737
(1982).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982), infra note
97.
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982).
9. [d.
10. Lacovara, Restricting the Private Law Practice of Former Government Lawyers,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 369 (1978) [hereafter Restricting Private Practice.)
This comment focuses on federal government lawyers, but similar ethical policies
and rules apply to state and local lawyers. For state cases so holding, see City of Hoquiam v. Public Employment Relations Commission, 628 P.2d 1314 (1981) (involving
DR9-101(B) and DR5-105(D»; State v. Nipps, 419 N.E.2d 1128 (1979) (upholding an
Ohio criminal statute restricting private practice of a former Chief of the Department of
Public Welfare).
In 1980, there were approximately 17,300 lawyers employed in the executive agencies
and departments of the federal government. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
OCCUPATIONS OF FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR WORKERS, October 31, 1981 (Washington, D.C.;
American Statistical Index 82 (1981) at 26). The lawyer turnover rate in federal agencies
is more than twice that of the national average for private law firms. See Jenkins, Working for Uncle Sam; The Flyway Problem of Federal Attorneys, STUDENT LAW., Apr.
1977, at 51. The government does not keep exact statistics on the federal turnover rate.
However, the various agencies do record the percentages of attorneys who resign each
year. [d.
11. Restricting Private Practice, supra note 10, at 371; G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW (1978). Professor Hazard discusses the advantages of entering the government at the beginning of a legal career at competitive salaries and with opportunities
for more responsibility than lawyers in the private sector. [d. at 107.
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their careers in the private sector and later move to the executive branch to serve for a period of time in the government. 12
The ethical rule that evolved over the years forbids a former
government lawyer from being involved in a matter for a private
client, for which the attorney had responsibility while working
for the government. 18 The problem of the revolving door practice
occurs when an apparent conflict of interest arises. This may
warrant the disqualification of a former government lawyer or
the firm with which the lawyer has become associated. I.
The ABA regulates the conduct of former government lawyers in Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B): "A lawyer shall not accept
private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee. "111 The admonition
of Canon 9, "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety,"18 coupled with the prohibition of DR9lOl(B), fail to provide clear ethical guidelines for the private
practice of former government attorneys.17
The federal courts employ DR9-101(B) of the MCPRI8 to
12. Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Rethinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707 (1981) [hereafter Rethinking the
Revolving Door.]
13. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 109 (1978).
14. Id. at 110. There is a problem with identifying on what matter the former government lawyer worked. It may have been a lawsuit, contract negotiation, a policy or
regulation, drafting the administration's legislative program, or lobbying a legislative·
program. Factors considered are the duration of the lawyer's responsibility and type of
office held.
The problem becomes severe when disqualification takes the revolving door lawyer
out of the job market or when the threat of disqualification forces the lawyer to become
a lifetime career servant. Either possibility would prevent the government from attracting competent lawyers. Id. at 112-114.
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR9-101(B) (1981).
16. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981). All states except
California and Georgia have adopted MCPR Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). See ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility by State, NAT'L CENTER FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
Two articles present detailed analyses of federal cases on point: O'Toole, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV.
313 (1979); Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the
Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1980).
17. See supra note 2.
18. The 1969 MCPR was essentially a redraft of the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics. They were modeled from the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics which was inspired by
the 1850 Lectures of George Sharswood, a Philadelphia judge. Kutak, A Commitment to
Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804, 805 (1982).
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disqualify former government lawyers from litigating a matter in
private practice. Ie The federal judiciary also applies DR9-101(B)
to disqualify by imputation a law firm whose associate is a disqualified former government lawyer under DR5-105(D).20 Case
law has developed a prohibition against the "appearance of impropriety" as a rule to discipline former government attorneys in
private practice. Since the ABA's adoption of the MCPR in
1969, the "appearance of impropriety" has evolved into an independent standard applied by federal judges to disqualify former
government lawyers whether or not they have actually breached
Canon 36 of the 1908 draft was the applicable ethical restriction preceding the
Code's Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). Canon 36 stated:
Retirement From Judicial Position or Public Employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in
any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted
in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or, having been in
the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
19. The genesis of this comment was a Motion for Disqualification in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, CR-81-205-Misc. In that
case, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 207 was charged in order to disqualify two recently resigned Strike Force attorneys who were hired to represent an unindicted defendant
against charges of prostitution which had been under investigation during their tenure in
the Department of Justice. These former government attorneys were disqualified for violating DR9-101(B)'s prohibition against the "appearance of impropriety." The evidence
showed an actual conflict of interest and potential breach of confidentiality of government information.
This author has found no federal cases disqualifying former government attorneys
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) or 5 C.F.R. § 737 (1982).
The Disciplinary Rules of the MCPR are usually enforced by disqualifying an attorney from representing a client. Professor Sutton, the reporter for the ABA Committee
that drafted the MCPR in 1969, has said that the MCPR's Disciplinary Rules were
drafted for use in disciplinary proceedings and were not intended to be procedural rules
in civil or criminal cases. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 N.C.L. REV. 497, 514-15 (1979). Nevertheless, the courts have regularly used
the disciplinary rules in disqualification motions.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-105(D) (1981) states: "If a
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, no associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, may accept or continue such employment." See, United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d
1198 (3d Cir. 1980). The circuit court upheld the district court's disqualification of a
former Strike Force lawyer as well as the disqualification of his entire law firm. The
court viewed the "appearance of impropriety" through the eyes of a hypothetical private
person. But see Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court
found that the appearance of impropriety was too slender a reed on which to grant a
motion to disqualify an entire law firm); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct.
C!. 1977) (screening procedures precluded disqualification of an entire law firm).
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an ethical consideration of the MCPR or violated DR9-101(B)'s
minimal standard of conduct.21
After observing the catastrophic ramifications of firm disqualification, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (CEPR) issued Formal Opinion 342 (Opinion
342) to interpret and limit the application of DR9-101(B)/~2 The
CEPR concluded that the appearance of professional impropriety was not a "standard, test, or element embodied in DR9101(B)."23 The committee said the" 'appearance of professional
impropriety' was only a policy consideration supporting the existence of the Disciplinary Rule."24 As a practical alternative to
firm disqualification, the CEPR recommended screening the disqualified former government lawyer-associate and obtaining the
government's waiver of the screening process. Unfortunately,
Opinion 342 did not define with precision any test for the appearance of impropriety; rather, the committee gave examples of
actual improper conflict of interest situations or of clear
breaches of client confidentiality.211
Opinion 342 represents the bar's formal position on ethical
restraints of the practice of revolving door lawyers. The opinion
addressed two issues: (1) what ethical considerations of the
MCPR warrant disqualification of a former government lawyer
under DR9-101(B)?; and, (2) should disqualification be imputed
to a law firm whose associate is disqualified? Opinion 342 is the
sole commentary from the bar on the ethical restrictions prescribed by the MCPR on the private practice of former government attorneys. Despite its limitation on DR9-101(B)'s applica21. Judge Kaufman, a leading authority in the field of legal ethics, described the
policy in this context: an attorney must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil. See
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70
HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (1957).
According to the federal courts, the MCPR places an ethical burden of avoiding the
appearance of evil uniquely on former government attorneys.
22. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
Formal opinions of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility are issued as interpretations of the MCPR. Formal Opinion 342 was an attempt to limit the ramifications of strictly applying DR9-101(B) to disqualification of an
entire law firm when one of its members was disqualified because of a conflict of interest.
23. Id. at 3.
24.ld.
25. Id. at 9-11. See also Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. at 1046.
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bility to disqualification of former government lawyers and their
law firms, the federal courts have generally ignored Opinion 342
and have continued to disqualify on the basis of the "appearance of impropriety."IIB
In discussing ethical restrictions on the practice of former
government lawyers, the CEPR in Opinion 342 briefly discussed
the relevance of MCPR Canon 4'Sll7 mandate of preserving confidentiality and Canon 5'S1l8 prohibition against lawyers' representation of differing interests. However, the focus of Opinion 342
was its interpretation of Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) in its application to the disqualification of former government lawyers and
law firms with which they become associated. First, the CEPR
found that the drafters of the MCPR did not intend the "ap26. WestinghoU8e Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978) (circuit court disqualified on the possibility of an appearance of impropriety); WestinghoU8e
Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978) (trial court did not disqualify, but circuit court reversed on the grounds of an
appearance of impropriety).
27. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981).
Under Canon 4, DR4-101(B) prohibits an attorney from revealing a confidence either to the disadvantage of his client or to his own or a third person's advantage, unless
the client consents after full disclosure. An attorney violates DR4-101(B) by knowingly
revealing a confidence of a client or by U8ing such a confidence improperly. Judge Kaufman, in Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex Inc., 478 F.2d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 1973), described the purpose of Canon 4 to encourage a client to discuss his problem freely and in
depth. This prevents a client from fearing that "information he reveals to his lawyer on
one day may be U8ed against him on the next." Emle emphasized the need to strictly
enforce Canon 4 to prevent the possibility, however slight, that confidential information
aCQuired from a client during a previoU8 relationship may be used subsequently to the
client's disadvantage. Id. at 571.
In the context of the revolving door, Canon 4's disciplinary rules protect the government's need to preserve confidential information acquired by lawyers in federal agencies.
The federal courts have enforced Canon 4's disciplinary provisions to disqualify former
government lawyers in private practice when the circumstances reveal an apparent or
actual conflict of interest violative of the government's privilege of confidentiality. Opinion 342 explained that DR4-101(B) has been the basis for disqualifying former government lawyers not because they actually breached the Rule, but 88 a prophylactic measure against a possible future violation. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 2.
28. "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981).
DR5-105(A) states:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance
of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve
him in representing different interests, except to the extent
permitted under DRS-I05(C).
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pearance of professional impropriety" to be a standard, test or
element embodied in DR9-101(B).29 According to the CEPR, the
"appearance of professional impropriety" is only a policy consideration supporting the disciplinary rule. 80 The authors acknowledged that: "The appearance of evil is only one of the underlying considerations, however, and is probably not the most
important reason for the creation and existence of the rule
itself. "81
Why then is DR9-101(B) included under Canon 9's prohibition against the appearance of professional impropriety? The
committee listed the policy arguments justifying its position in
Canon 9 as: (1) the treachery inherent in switching sides; (2)
protection of confidential government information from use in
future litigation against the government; (3) the need to discourage government lawyers from structuring their government service to advance their own careers in the private sector; and (4)
the benefit to the profession derived from avoiding the appearance of evil. SI
On the other hand, the CEPR recognized weighty policy arguments against having a special disciplinary rule limiting the
employment of former government lawyers in conjunction with
Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety" standard. The arguments given were that: (1) such a rule restricts the government's
ability to recruit young professional and competent lawyers
without penalizing them when they subsequently enter private
practice; (2) disqualification motions often are a tool to delay
29. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 3.
30. "DR9-101(B) is located under Canon 9 because the 'appearance of professional
impropriety' is a policy consideration supporting the existence of the disciplinary rule."
ld.
31. [d.
32. [d. at 3-4. The CEPR quotes Judge Winestein's comment in Silver Chrysler

Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973):
Defendants seem to suggest that the complexities of the factual determination to be made by this court should be avoided
by a decision couched in notions of possible appearance of impropriety. On the contrary, the importance of the underlying
policy considerations call for careful analysis of the matters
embraced by previous and present litigations. Vague or indefinite allegations do not suffice . . . . The danger of damage to
public confidence in the legal profession would be great if we
were to allow unfounded charges of impropriety to form the
sole basis for an unjust disqualification. [d. at 589.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 4

440

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:433

litigation and enhance counsel's prospects of winning by disposing of an opponent's competent counsel; and, (3) a litigant has a
right to have counsel of choice, particularly in specialized areas
of law. 33
In balancing the policy considerations of DR9-101(B)'s existence in Canon 9 of the MCPR, the authors of Opinion 342 concluded that the rule should be given a narrow construction by
the courts. Such construction would limit neither the government's ability to recruit competent lawyers nor an individual's
right to have counsel of his choice. 34 The opinion also stated that
firm disqualification was adverse to the government's interests
to recruit qualified lawyers and the public's interest to obtain
counsel of choice, particularly in specialized areas. 311 The authors
limited the provision which could allow disqualification of an entire firm when one of its attorneys was unable to appear as a
representative against a former agency. 38
Thus, the CEPR, without further reason, and in direct contradiction to Canon 5's disciplinary rule l05(D), found that
screening the disqualified former government lawyer from participation in the matter, and from the firm's compensation generated from the matter, satisfied DR-I05(D). The committee
also recommended that the government agency should approve
or waive the screening of the disqualified former government
33. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 4-5.
34. Id. at 11.
35. "Only allegiance to form over substance would justify blanket application of
DR5-105(D) in a manner that thwarts and distorts the policy considerations behind
DR9-IOI(B)." Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11.
36. In 1974, the ABA amended DR5-105(D) to read: "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue such employment."
Soon after this amendment, controversy arose as to the imputed disqualification of a
law firm which had hired a former government lawyer who had switched sides and was
thereby disqualified. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Evidently, the ABA had given no consideration to the impact of DR5-105(D) on the revolving door lawyer, his partners or associates. Restricting Priuate Practice, supra note 10,
at 379.
As stated, the CEPR attempted to limit DR5-105(D)'s application to DR9-101(B) in
Opinion 342. Opinion 342 found that a disqualified former government attorney's law
firm would not be disqualified if: (1) the disqualified former government lawyer was
screened from participation in the action and from sharing in fees derived from the client; and (2) the government agency or department were required to waive the screen.
Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11.
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lawyer. Screening and waiver would fulfill the requirements of
DR9-101(B) and not mandate an entire firm's disqualification
when one of its associates was disqualified. 87
In reaching this conclusion, the CEPR circumvented a literal reading of the MCPR. 88 The authors did not explain why
DR5-105(D) is inapplicable to disqualify a law firm whose member is disqualified by DR9-101(B). In a recent article,8e Professors Finman and Schneyer examined the CEPR's interpretation
of the MCPR and criticized the CEPR's unexplained reading of
the literal meaning of the disciplinary rules!O They charged that
Opinion 342 was an attempt to rewrite the MCPR, not to interpret it. 41 In particular, the article discussed Opinion 342's disregard of the "unambiguous command-the plain meaning-of
DR5-105(D)"411 in disqualifying an entire law firm whose member is a disqualified former government lawyer. In attempting to
justify Opinion 342's failure to apply DR5-105(D), the authors
speculate that the CEPR found that: "its gloss on the [Disciplinary Rules] is legitimate, because that gloss will decrease the
undesirable consequences of disqualification without reducing
the benefits that a literal reading would yield. ".8
Thus, one must conclude, as did Professors Finman and
Schneyer, that "for several reasons not mentioned in Opinion
342, it is doubtful whether the values served by a literal reading
[of the MCPR] would be as well protected by the CEPR's
gloss."··
A literal reading of Opinion 342 also leads one to the con37. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11-12.
38. The CEPR's conclusions on the enforcement of DR9-101(B) and DR5-105(D)
are realistic and pragmatic, although not justified by reading the MCPR.
39. Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulat-

ing Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 67, 141-144 (1981).
40. ld. at 142. Addressing the question of DR5-105(D)'s applicability to the imputed
disqualification of a law firm whose member is barred from participation by DR9-101{B),
the authors stated: "The Code seems to allow only one answer: DR5-105{D) bars an entire firm if any member is disqualified under 'a Disciplinary Rule'; a firm member barred
by DR9-101{B) is disqualified by 'a Disciplinary Rule'; ergo the entire firm is barred." ld.
at 141.
41. ld. at 141.
42.ld.
43. ld. at 142.
44.ld.
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clusion that the ABA committee was unable to sustain DR9lOl(B),s inclusion in the MCPR under the maxim of Canon 9's
avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. In fact, the committee affirmatively told the courts that the "appearance of professional impropriety" is not a standard embodied in DR9-101(B).411
At most, the committee stated, the appearance of impropriety is
a policy consideration which should be construed favorably not
to disqualify a revolving door lawyer.
Despite Opinion 342's narrow construction of DR9-101(B)
and conclusion that the appearance of impropriety is no standard for its enforcement, the courts have relied on Canon 9 to
disqualify former government lawyers and their law firms. The
federal courts have enforced DR9-101(B) on a case by case basis.
This has produced a broad, vague standard of the meaning of
"appearance of professional impropriety," enforced with imprecise, subjective decisions.'6 This subjective method of interpretation of the "appearance of impropriety" gives government lawyers, former government lawyers, and law firms wishing to hire
government lawyers no reliable standard to guide post-government conduct. 47
A leading case, General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,'8
demonstrates the dilemma of the revolving door lawyer. A former Department of Justice attorney who had prosecuted an antitrust suit against General Motors was hired by the City of New
York and assigned to represent it in a similar suit against General Motors. The court acknowledged that the attorney had not
45. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 3.
46. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1980); O'Toole, Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 313 (1979).
47. Kramer, supra note 46, at 244. Donald A. Farmer was formerly Director of the
Bureau of International Aviation, United States Civil Aeronautics Board and prior to
that Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, and Trial Attorney, Antitrust,
United States Department of Justice. He entered private practice in 1979 after ten years
of government service. When questioned about the present rules and restrictions on the
private practice of revolving door lawyers Mr. Farmer wrote that he believed them to be
out of touch with reality and becoming further detached rather than less. His opinion is
that the unfortunate result of all this is that many lawyers going through the revolving
door do not even know what the rules are, much less comply with them. Letter of Donald
A. Farmer, Jr. to Barbara Mance (August 27, 1982).
48. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
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changed sides, but still held that his representation in opposition to the defendant corporation violated the ethical precepts
of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). The court stated that the impropriety involved the "possibility that a lawyer might wield government power with a view toward subsequent private gain. "49 As a
result, the court disqualified the former justice department lawyer even though he had not switched sides or sought employment with the City of New York while working as a federal prosecutor. The standard which evolved from this case was the
"possibility" of impropriety, one even more nebulous and
ephemeral than "appearance of impropriety."
The Ninth Circuit, in In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,IIO held that Canon 9 would be stripped of its meaning and significance if it
were not separately enforced to disqualify former government
attorneys in private practice. III The court determined that since
it is instructed to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process
in the eyes of the public,1I2 Canon 9 must be a sufficient ground
for disqualification. The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that its
responsibility of controlling the conduct of attorneys who appeared before the court justified its ability to disqualify attorneys for actual conduct that impugns the integrity of the court
or for conduct that appears to be improper. liS
49. rd. at 650 n. 20. The court believed that this violation of Canon 9 and DR9101(B) was justified because "there lurks great potential for lucrative returns in following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of government resources." rd. Cf, United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
where in a similar fact situation no appearance of evil was found.
50. 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
51. rd. at 1360.
52. See United Sewerage Agency, Etc. v. Jelco, 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. 658 F.2d 1360-61. The Ninth Circuit's decision is in direct conflict with the bar's
official position in Opinion 342. According to O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1979), three
basic issues are raised by Canon 9's application to disqualify former government
attorneys:
First, is Canon 9 intended to be used within the context of
litigation or is it only intended to serve as an axiomatic guideline to the praticing attorney? Second, from whose perspective
is the propriety of appearances measured? Third, can improper appearances alone suffice to trigger disqualification of
opposing counsel?
rd. at 318. The author terms the application of Canon 9 a murky subject of legal ethics
and raises the example of a court's disqualifying an attorney even in an instance when
Canon 9 had not been explored in briefs addressing the motion. rd. citing Richardson v.
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A recent case from the Second Circuit, Armstrong v.
McAlpin,1I4 demonstrates the state of confusion that exists when
federal courts enforce DR9-101(B) of the present MCPR. In
McAlpin, Theodore Altman, a former Assistant Director of the
Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became a partner in a private law firm, the
Gordon Firm. At the SEC Altman had had supervisory and "direct, personal involvement"lIlI in the investigation of Clovis
McAlpin. The SEC filed a complaint against McAlpin for securities violations. Subsequently, Altman left the SEC to join the
Gordon firm. At that time the Gordon firm was not involved in
the prosecution of McAlpin.
Armstrong was appointed receiver in the action, and the
SEC made its investigatory files available to him. Armstrong was
forced to seek new counsel in the action and consulted one of
the partners of the Gordon firm about his retaining the firm.
The court approved the appointment of the Gordon firm, provided that Altman, who was clearly disqualified,1I6 was properly
screened. The SEC waived any objection. Armstrong filed an action against McAlpin for fraud and damages of $24,000,000. The
defendant moved to disqualify the Gordon firm on the ground
that Altman's disqualification should be imputed to the entire
Gordon firm. The district court denied the motion. 1I7
The Second Circuit Court reversed and found that disqualification of the firm necessary "as a prophylactic measure to
guard against misuse of authority by government lawyers."118
Upon rehearing, the court reversed because there had been no
Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972).
A number of courts have held that Ethical Consideration 9:3 and DR9-101(B) apply
even where a former government lawyer's representation of a private client does not impugn the position she took in a particular matter while in public employment. This was
the court's belief in General Motors, supra note 50.
Ethical Consideration 9:3 states: "After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public
employment, he should not accept employment in connection with any matter in which
he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would
give the appearance of impropriety even if none exists."
54. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
55. 606 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
56. The trial court disqualified him under DR9-10I(B). 625 F.2d at 442.
57. [d. at 443.
58. 606 F.2d at 34.
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threat to the integrity of the trial processll9 due to: (1) the
screening of Altman;80 (2) the routine turnover of SEC files to
Armstrong before he retained the Gordon firm; and, (3) the absence of any indication that the receiver came to the firm
through or because of Altman's connection. 81
The circuit court concluded that disqualification of the firm
could only be based on the appearance of impropriety stemming
from Altman's association with the firm. The court balanced the
appearance of impropriety against the plaintiffs' interest in proceeding and redress of the alleged frauds and concluded that the
Gordon firm must not be barred from the action. 811 The court
followed a practical, narrow construction of the appearance of
impropriety by finding that: "[u]nder the circumstances, the
possible 'appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed
on which to rest a disqualification order . . . particularly . . .
where ... the appearance of impropriety is not very clear.' "88
In Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville,84 a case involving a
former government lawyer who specialized in asbestosis litigation, a majority of the Fourth Circuit found the particular firm's
shielding provisions to be adequate. These included prohibiting
the former justice department lawyer "from working, advising or
participating, indirectly, by discovery, analysis or otherwise [in
the actions in dispute] . . . He was to be denied access to the
files and prohibited from sharing profits derived from the . . .
cases. "811 The majority relied on Opinion 342, rejecting a literal
59. 625 F.2d at 445.
60. ld. The case. therefore. is entirely distinguishable from General Motors. 501
F.2d 639. The court did not scrutinize the screening provisions since the SEC had found
them satisfactory.
61. ld.
62. ld. at 446.
63. ld. at 445. quoting Board of Education v. Nyquist. 590 F.2d 1241. 1247 (2d Cir.
1979). The court also said that absent a threat of taint to the trial. ethical conflicts are
better addressed by the disciplinary machinery of the state and federal bar or by legislation such as 18 U.S.C. § 207. 625 F.2d at 441.
64. No. 81-1379. slip op. (4th Cir. March 5. 1982).
65. No. 81-1379. slip op. at 6-7 (4th Cir. March 5. 1982). The courts are more amenable to finding that a "Chinese Wall" was erected in the screening mechanism in Canon
9 cases than in situations where a p08Bible violation of Canon 4 or Canon 5 has or will
occur. Courts will consider policy arguments for not disqualifying a law firm that has
hired a former government attorney. See Kesselhaut v. United States. 555 F.2d 791. 793
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (The court held that a former government lawyer would take on the status
of Typhoid Mary and be reduced to sole practice under the most unfavorable condi-
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interpretation of the MCPR. The majority opinion deferred to
the justice department's approval of the disqualified former government lawyer's firm's screening measures and stated that the
"affected client agencies of the government are the best judges
of the suitability of screens erected to protect them from disclosures of confidences and secrets."ss More importantly, the majority cited Rule 1.11 of the ABA Proposed Final Draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which eliminates the "appearance of professional impropriety" standard governing the
disqualification of former government lawyers. s7

III.

FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FOR

MER GOVERNMENT LA WYERS

Congress has enacted legislation to regulate the private
practice of former government lawyers. As stated in the legislative history, the purpose of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act
was to enforce and reform the ethical standards governing the
post-government employment of present and former federal officials in the executive branch of the government. S8 Federal offitions.). Comment, Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 677, 693 (1980).
66. No. 81-1379, slip op. at 10 (4th Cir. March 5, 1982).
67. [d.
68. For the legislative history and purpose of the Act, see S. REP. No. 170, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in part in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4216 and H.R.
REP. No. 115, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 328.
According to S. REP. No. 170 at 4217: "The purpose of this legislation [Ethics in Government Act) is to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public officials
and of the institutions of the Federal Government and to invigorate the Constitutional
separation of powers between the three branches of government."
The Act originated as the Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, S. 403-7, sponsored
by the eleven-member Senate Committee on Government Affairs. The Act consists of
five sections, but only sections four and five regulate the revolving door lawyer/employee
problem. Section four, Title IV, created the Office of Government Ethics.
According to the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK, THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS, 1981-82 at 600, Title IV has the responsibility to develop and to recommend, to the Office of Per~onnel Management and the Attorney General, rules and regulations concerning conflicts of interest and ethics in the executive branch. These rules
and regulations are promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management and codified at
5 C.F.R. § 737 (1982).
The Office also was established to monitor, investigate, and enforce compliance with
the conflict of interest and public financial disclosure laws and regulations. 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4264. (S. REP. No. 170 at 148.) See Duplantier V. United
States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981). (Upholding the
constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301·309 (Judicial Personnel Financial Disclosure
Requirements».
The Office also has the responsibility to promote an understanding of the ethical
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cials covered by the Act are lawyers and other professionals, including military personnel, who serve in executive departments
and agencies.
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 737 prohibits a former government lawyer's representation of a private
client involving a conflict of interest. Section 737.5(a) prohibits a
former government attorney from ever representing a person in
any informal or formal appearance before the United States
courts in connection with any particular government matter involving a specific party in which matter he or she participated
personally and substantially as a government employee. 8s "Personal" participation means direct involvement and includes the
participation of a subordinate when actually directed by the former government employee.'o "Substantial" means that the attorstandards in the executive agencies so that employees will know of the procedures involved and of any changes in the laws or regulations. 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
at 4263. The Director refers problems to the Department of Justice for disciplinary proceedings. S. REP. No. 170 at 146-48.
The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the Director of
the Office of Government Ethics. 5 U.S.C. app. I § 401 codifies his functions. According
to the San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 1982, at 8 Col. 3 "The first director of the
Office of Government Ethics, J. Jackson Walter, is resigning because of the wide-ranging
controversies involving the enforcement of the financial disclosure regulations of the Act.
High-level officials, members of Congress, and federal judges have refused to forthrightly
comply with the Act's provisions." The Chronicle pointed out that the director does not
have the power to impose sanctions if he does not approve an incumbent official's
financial statement. Also the director has no authority to audit financial forms. According to Walter, his main· role was to write advisory opinions for companies on the propriety of former government employees' passage through the revolving door.
Section five, Title V, of the Act, sets forth the laws restricting the post-service activities by officials and employees of the executive agencies and departments. The Act
amended and expanded the criminal penalties imposed on disqualified former government lawyers in 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1979). "But Title V does more than establish a crime
and provide for administrative discipline: it is also a general standard for what is to be
considered proper ethical conduct by former government officials . . . . In short it is a
statement of federal policy on this aspect of conflict of interest." S. REp. No. 170 at 3132.
69. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(a) (1982). Section 737.5(b) explains the prohibition with an
illustration:
The target of this provision is the former employee who participates in a particular matter while employed by the Government and later "switches sides" by representing another person on the same matter.
Example 1: A lawyer in the Department of Justice personally works on an antitrust case involving Q Company. After
leaving the Department, he is asked by Q Company to represent it in that case. He may not do so.
70. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(d)(l) (1982).
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ney's involvement must be of significance to the matter, or form
a basis for a reasonable appearance of such significance. 71 While
a series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, a single
act of approval or participation in a critical step may be a substantial act. 72
Further, one's governmental (official) responsibility may
contribute to the substantiality of an employee's participation.
If an employee has responsibility for review of a matter "and
action cannot be undertaken over his or her objection, the result
may be different. If the employee reviews a matter and passes it
on, his or her participation may be regarded as 'substantial' even
if he or she claims merely to have engaged in inaction. "73
The rules of the Office of Government Ethics specifically define "the same particular matter" as one involving the "same basic facts, related issues, the same or related parties, time
elapsed, the same confidential information, and the continued
existence of an important Federal interest."74 The particular
matter must be one in which the United States is a party or has
an interest in, and the importance of the federal interest is a
determining factor.711
71. Id. "Example 2: A Government lawyer is not in charge of, nor has official responsibility for a particular case, but is frequently consulted as to filings, discovery, and strategy. Such an individual has personally and substantially participated in the matter."
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 737.5(d)(3) (1982).
74. Id. at § 737.5(c)(4) (1982). One example illustrative of the "same particular matter" given here is:
A Government employee reviewed and approved certain wiretap applications. The prosecution of a person overheard during the wiretap, although not originally targeted, must be regarded as part of the same particular matter as the initial
wiretap application. The reason is that the validity of the
wiretap may be put in issue and many of the facts giving rise
to the wiretap application would be involved.
Id.
75. Id. at § 737.5(c)(5) Example 1 (1982):
Example 1: An attorney participated in preparing the Government's antitrust action against Z Company. After leaving the
Government, she may not represent Z Company in a private
antitrust action brought against it by X Company on the same
facts involved in the Government action. Nor may she represent X Company in that matter. The interest of the United
States in preventing both inconsistent results and the appearance of impropriety in the same factual matter involving the
same party, Z CQmpany, is direct and substantial. However, if
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In addition to the life-time ban on a matter in which the
government lawyer participated personally and substantially,
section 737.7(a) imposes a two year prohibition on a former government lawyer's participation in a matter in private practice
which was pending under his or her responsibility one year
before leaving government service. 76 For any possible violation
of these regulations, the Office of Government Ethics may initiate disciplinary proceedings. 77
Title V of the Ethics in Government Act amended 18 U.S.C.
section 207, the criminal statute proscribing unlawful appearances or conduct of former government lawyers representing private clients on a matter in which they participated as a government employee. 76 Amended section 207 penalizes former
government lawyers for participating in three specific conflict of
interest contexts. 79 Professor Mundheim has summarized the rethe Government's antitrust investigation or CBBe is closed, the
United States no longer hBB a direct and substantial interest
in the CBBe.
76. 5 C.F.R. § 737.7(a)(1982).
77. 5 U.S.C. app. I § 401.
78. Disqualification of former officers and employees; disqualification of partners of
current officers and employees. 18 U.S.C. § 207, BB amended, Pub. L. No. 95-521, Title V,
§ 501(a), (1978), Pub. L. No. 96-28, §§ I, 2 (1979). First, the 1978 amendments to § 207
expanded the lifetime ban to formal or "informal appearances" or "with the intent to
influence" or make "any oral or written communication" in a matter in which an official
participated personally and substantially involving a specific party or parties with whom
the United States or the District of Columbia hBB a direct and substantial interest. Second, subsection (b) WBB amended from a one year to a two year ban on activity (formal
or informal, or with the intent to influence, make any oral or written communication)
actually pending under the official's responsibility within a period of one year prior to
the termination of his responsibility. Third, subsections (c) and (d) place a new one year
restriction on former high level officials from appearing before the department or agency
in which they served. 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 31, at 330.
79. The pertinent sections of 18 U.S.C. § 207 are BB follows:
(a) Whoever, having been an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, of any independent agency of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, including a special Government employee, after his
employment hBB· ceBBed, knowingly acts BB agent or attorney
for, or otherwise, represents, any other person (except the
United States), in any formal or informal appearance before,
or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or written
communication on behalf of any other person (except the
United States) to(1) any department, agency, court, court-martial, or any
civil, military, or naval commission of the United States or the
District of Columbia, or any officer or employee thereof, and
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vised statute as follows:
First, it bars a former Government employee
from ever making an appearance before or a communication to a court or agency on behalf of a
party in a particular matter in which he participated personally and substantially while in government service. Under the Act the former government employee can advise, counselor assist in
a matter on which he switched sides so long as he
himself avoids appearing or communicating.
Second, the Act places a two-year ban on appearing before or communicating with a court or
agency on behalf of a party in a particular matter
which was pending under the employee's official
responsibility in his last year of government service. Like the first ban, it does not ban advising,
(2) in connection with any judicial or other proceeding,
application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter involving a specific party or
parties in which the United States or the District of Columbia
is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, and
(3) in which he participated personally and substantially
as an officer or employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation
or otherwise, while so employed; or
(b) Whoever, (i) having been so employed within two years after his employment has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any other person (except
the United States), in any formal or informal appearance
before, or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or written communication on behalf of any other person (except the
United States) to, or (ii) having been so employed and as specified in sub-section (d) of this section, within two years after
his employment has ceased, knowingly represents or aids,
counsels, advises, consults, or assists in representing any other
person (except the United States) by personal presence at any
formal or informal appearance before(1) any department, agency, court, court-martial, or any
civil, military or naval commission of the United States or the
District of Columbia, or any officer or employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any judicial, rule-making, or other
proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter, and
(3) which is pending before such department or agency or
in which such department or agency has a direct and substantial interest-shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
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assisting, counseling or consulting behind the
scenes.
Third, the Act also imposes a one-year ban
on senior government officials from appearing
before their former agencies on any matter, including new matters . . . .

It does not preclude the senior officials from giving advice behind the scenes, because it is not his
knowledge, but the possible undue influence associated with use of his name which is sought to be
restricted. 80

The statute's effects are to eliminate offiCial corruption, to insure that former government lawyers will not exercise undue influence over former colleagues, and to encourage officials to scrutinize their subsequent activities as private citizens with a higher
degree of caution. 81 Although section 207 is a criminal statute, it
was passed to provide a general standard for proper ethical conduct for former government officials and as a model for agency
and department regulations. 81
At the time of its enactment in 1978, the Senate Report
conceded that public confidence in government had been weakened "by a wide-spread conviction that federal officials use federal office for personal gain, particularly after they leave government service. "88 The Senate committee stated that the public
suspiciously viewed the revolving door between industry and
government thereby eroding confidence in the integrity of the
federal government. 84
On the other hand, the legislative history of the statute
reveals that Congress recognized weighty public policy reasons
mandating the government's ability to attract and hire qualified,
talented individuals for executive service. In 1979, when section
207 was amended,811 heads of various executive departments tesSO. Mundheim, Rethinking the RelJollJing Door, supra note 12, at 714. Reference is
made to §§ 207(a), 207(b)(3), 207(b)(i), 207(c). See 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
4216, 4263ff. for a detailed explanation of 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(b) & (c).
81. 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 4247.
82. Id. at 4248.
83.Id.
84.Id.
85. H.R. REP. No. 115 cited in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 328. 330-333.
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tified that: (1) movement back and forth from private industry
to government is valuable to the individual and allows the government to recruit talented employees;88 (2) if such movement
were restricted by an ambiguous and harsh statute, the civil service would become a stagnant bureaucracy isolated from the energy of outsiders and fresh competition;87 and, (3) the government must balance its interest with those of affected individuals
whose career options upon leaving government service would be
severely restricted. 88

IV. PROPOSED ABA REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF
FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission)88 has recommended the bar's
adoption for the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(MRPC)80 including proposed Rule 1.11, entitled Successive
Government and Private Employment. 81 The Kutak Commis86. 1d. at 331. Testimony of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W.
Duncan, Jr.:
Moreover, a law which discourages movement between the private and public sector would further isolate dedicated career
civil servants from other citizens at a time when alienation between Government and the tax-paying public is eroding faith
in our national institutions. Our Government has long benefited from the mix of career ~d short-term employees in its
service, and this committee believes that the interchange this
provides with the private sector must be preserved.
1d. at 332.
87. 1d. at 331. The House Committee noted the importance of attracting individuals
from the private sector for limited periods of time who would challenge the conventional
wisdom of their superiors, knowing that they can readily find private employment if neceSBarY. 1d. at 332.
88. 1d. Testimony of former chairman Charles Curtis of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
89. The ABA Commission of Evaluation of Professional Standards is chaired by
Robert J. Kutak. It should be noted that Mr. Kutak chairs a commission, not a standing
committee of the ABA, and the commission includes non-lawyers. The commission was
appointed in 1977 by the then ABA President William B. Spann, Jr. It was charged with
undertaking a comprehensive rethinking of ethics of the profession of law. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Final Draft 1981, Chairman's Introduction.
90. American Bar Association, Materials on Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
v. I, ANNUAL MEETING 1982, San Francisco, California. See also Kutak, A Commitment
to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804 (1982).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 Successive Government and
Private Employment (Final Draft 1982) reads:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter
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sion's draft has eliminated Canon 9's ethical dominion over the
private practice of former government lawyers and has streamlined the rules governing disqualification imputed to a law firm
in which the lawyer participated pereonally and substantially
as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm
with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
(1) The disqualified laywer is screened from any
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part
of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
(b) Except as law may otherwise expreaely permit. a lawyer who has knowledge, acquired as a public officer or employee, of confidential government information about a pereon, may not represent a private client whose interests are
adverse to that pereon in a matter in which the information is
material. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is aeeociated may undertake or continue representation in the matter
unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is ecreened from any
participation in the' matter and is apportioned no part
of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the adverse
party to enable that pereon to ascertain compliance
with the provisions of this rule.
(c) Except as law may otherwise expreaely permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:
(1) Participate in a matter. in which the lawyer
participated pereonally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unleea
under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation
may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's ltead in the
matter; or
(2) Negotiate for private employment with any pereon who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party
in a matter in which the lawyers is participating pereonally and substantially.
(d) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes:
(1) Any judicial or other proceeding, application,
request for a ruling or other determination, contract.
claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party
or parties; and
(2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.
(e) As used in this rule, the term "confidential government information" means information which, at the time this
rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosure to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose.
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where members are disqualified former government lawyers.
Proposed Rule 1.11 is based substantially on the federal law of
the Ethics in Government Act and recognizes the controlling
regulations proscribing conflicts of interest. 811
Rule 1.11 is designed to integrate in organization and substance with other rules defining the duties of the client-lawyer
relationship, specifically Rule 1.9, Conflict of Interest: Former
Client, and Rule 1.10, Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. lla
As stated by Chairman Robert Kutak: "The overriding objective
of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards during these past five years has been to develop professional standards that are comprehensive, consistent, constitutional, and,
most important, congruent with other law of which they are a
part.''''
With no admonition of avoiding the appearance of professional impropriety, Rule 1. 11 (a) begins: "Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee . . . ."811
This prohibition is similar to DR9-101(B)'s prohibition that
a "lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee.''" Rule 1.11 specifically stated "personal" participation by the former government lawyer and offers a more concrete standard consistent with federal statute and regulation.
The requirement of personal participation enables a former government lawyer to know when post-government representation
92. Proposed Rule 1.11 defen to law regulating the private practice of fonner government Iawyen. The 1969 MCPR did not parallel federal statutes. See Proposed Rule
1.11 Comment, 68 A.B.A.J. 1331, 1410 (1982).
93. Kutalt, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A Report to the Bar, 68
A.B.A.J. 1019, 1023 (1982). Mr. Kutak has pointed out that the organizational fonnat of
the rules is a legislative one rather than one composed of canons, ethical considerations
and aspirations. See also Kutalt, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations
about the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. I, 5
(1980).
94. See note 93 supra, Kutak, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A
Report to the Bar at 1023.
95. MODEL RULBS 0' PRoPE8SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982).
96. MODEL CODE 0' PBOPE8SIONAL REsPONsm1L1TY DR9-101(b) (1981).
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is barred.
The term "matter" is defined in subsection (d)(l) as a judicial proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific
party or parties; or in (d)(2) any other conflict of interest matter
covered by the appropriate government agency.S? Rule 1. 11 (a) is
a comprehensive improvement of DR9-101(B) since the old rule
never addresses the specifics of the term.
The proposed rule provides for a permanent ban on an individual lawyer's participation on a matter in which he was personally and substantially responsible unless the appropriate government agency consents to the participation. The rule also
disqualifies firms if: (1) the disqualified former government lawyer is not screened from participation in the matter or from any
part of the fees; and, (2) written notice is not given promptly to
the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain
compliance with the screening mechanism. ss The Rule' adopts
the screening device sanctioned by Opinion 342 to bar firm disqualification, but does not mandate agency waiver, rather agency
"compliance." Thus, Rule 1.11 fulfills the Greitzer majority's belief that a government agency is the best judge of the suitability
of screens erected to protect it from disclosure of confidential
information.ee
These proposed prOVISIons governing disqualification imputed to a law firm are important additions to the ABA ethical
code. Subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2) remedy the 1969 Code's failure to deal with the realities of modern law practice. loo It is essential that the ABA establish clear, workable rules for the re97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982).
98. Id. at (a)(I), (a)(2). The screening and agency approval provisions are in conformity with the recent order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of April 30,
1982, which also eliminated the waiver requirement of the federal agency but required
filings by firm associates. (Memorandum of David B. Isbell to D.C. Bar Board of Governors: The Final Spin of the "Revolving Door": The D.C. Court of Appeals' Order of April
30, 1982, at 6.) (Letter of Philip A. Lacovara to Barbara Mance, (July 26, 1982».
99. See notes 93-95, supra.
100. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics, Some Observations about the Proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. at 3. Mr. Kutak cbaracterized
the 1969 Code as conceiving of the practice of law as it was in downstate Dlinois of the
1860's.
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volving door lawyer and prospective law firms which hire
revolving door lawyers. The legislative history of the 1978 Ethics
in Government Act reveals that Congress refrained from addressing this issue of disqualification imputed to a law firm and
implicitly left it to the legal profession to self-regulate. lol
The proposed rule will provide the courts with standards to
measure the conflict of interest inherent in the revolving door
situation, give agencies the opportunity to maintain confidentiality, and give private firms a way to determine when one of their
attorneys who has been hired from the government will be able
to operate without fear of disqualification. No longer will the
federal courts have the "appearance of professional impropriety"
as a standard to disqualify a law firm whose member is personally disqualified. lOll
The comment to Rule 1.11 discusses the policy arguments in
support of the screening and agency approval provisions of the
proposed rule. loa Not only is the government's need to attract
highly qualified lawyers legitimate, it is necessary to sustain a
democratic government system which competes with private industry. For that reason, the comment determines that it would
101. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 68, at 149.
102. Letter from Philip A. Lacovara to Barbara Mance (August 16, 1982). Mr. Lacovara predicted that, even though the proposed Model Rules have eliminated the "appearance of impropriety" as a textual basis for disqualification of former government
lawyers, that standard may yet survive in disqualification motions. The argument will be
that the "appearance of impropriety" standard is a general principle of professional behavior which the courts have inherent power to administer. To support his contention,
see Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1976) quoting Rich8rdson
v. Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86, (3d Cir. 1972):
Whenever an allegation is made that an attorney has violated.
his moral and ethical responsibility, an important question of
profeBBional ethics is raised. It is the duty of the district court
to examine the charge, since it is that court which is authorized to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar. The
courts, as well as the bar, have a responsibility to maintain
public confidence in the legal profeBBion. This means that a
court may disqualify an attorney for not only acting improperly but also for failing t() avoid the appearance of
impropriety.
. . . (T]he regulation of attorneys appearing before the
district court in these matters will be disturbed only when, on
review of the record, we can say that the district court abused
its permiBBible discretion.
535 F.2d at 1324-25 (footnotes omitted).
103. Proposed Rule 1.11 Comment, 68 A.B.A.J. 1331 (1982).
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be against public policy to restrict the private practice of former
government lawyers, except in circumstances of actual conflicts
of interest or potential breaches of the privilege of confidentiality.
Removing the "appearance of impropriety" from the ethical
code governing the private practice of former government lawyers equates their duties with the ethical responsibilities of all
lawyers. 104 There is no legitimate reason why the ABA Code
should stigmatize former government lawyers and essentially
jeopardize their careers after leaving government service. The
"appearance of impropriety" is an unjustifiable standard that
creates the assumption that "government lawyers" cannot be
trusted to discharge their public responsibilities faithfully while
in office, or to abide fully by screening procedures afterwards. lOll
Subsection (a) of proposed Rule 1.11 permits lawyers who have
served the government to practice in another capacity. The proposed rule allows the revolving door lawyer to pursue a postgovernment service career cognizant of his ethical and legal duties, rather than confused by the undefined standard of impropriety conceived by a court.
Subsection (b) of MRPC Rule 1.11 is an unique addition to
the final draft which incorporates MCPR Canon 4's protection
of client-attorney confidences. The subsection prohibits a former
government lawyer who has gained knowledge of confidential
government information about a person from representing a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter
in which the information is material. loe
Subsection (c) of the proposed rule incorporates MCPR Ca104. Letter from Donald A. Fanner to Barbara Mance (August TT, 1982). Mr.
Farmer expressed his opinion that former government lawyers often are called upon to
deal with ethical constraints arising out of confiict of interest principles because of their
past involvement in important public responsibilities.
105. Brief of Certain Lawyers as Amici Curiae on Rehearing En Bane, Amlstrong v.
McAlpin, No. 79-7042, at 2 (1980).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.11(b)(e) (Final Draft 1982).
This ban on the use of confidential government information in private practice disqualifies an individual lawyer; likewise, a firm is disqualified unless the lawyer is screened and
given no share of the fees generated. These measures must be approved by the adverse
party. Confidential information is defined in subsection (e) as information which the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege Dot to
disclose.
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non 5's proscription of a former government lawyer "switching
sides" or representing adverse interests in a matter. The rule is
carefully drafted to prohibit a government lawyer's: (1) participation in a matter in which he or she participated personally
and substantially while in nongovernment employment unless
under the law no one may act in the lawyer's place; and, (2) negotiation for private employment with any person involved in a
matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially. 107
This study of proposed Rule l.11(b) and (c) demonstrates
that the Kutak Commission has preserved the Code's Disciplinary Rules of Canon 4 and Canon 5 in the proposed regulation
of the ethical restraints on the private practice of former government lawyers. First, the rule prohibits a former government lawyer from revealing or using, to his private client's advantage, information he acquired while a government employee. The
prohibition of subsection (b) is clear and focuses on the preservation of the client-attorney privilege which is the emphasis of
the proposed Model Rules. lOS A lawyer has a duty to a client or
former client of utmost loyalty and confidentiality, now recognized in the ABA proposed regulation of the private practice of
former government lawyers. 109
Second, the prohibition of subsection (c) enforces MCPR
Canon 5's application when former government lawyers "switch
sides" in passing through the revolving door. The proposed rule
protects the public from former government lawyers' "structuring their government service to advance their own careers in the
private sector and ... [incurring) the appearance of evil."llo If
approved by the ABA House of Delegates, this section will serve
to protect the integrity of government decision making, III as a
prophylactic measure to guard against misuse of authority by
government lawyers. "1 III
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(c) (Final Draft 1982).
108. Kutak, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A Report to the Bar,
68 A.B.A.J. at 1020: "No fundamental professional value assumed larger importance in
the commission's work than that of client-lawyer confidentiality."
109. Kutak, A Commitment to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804, 805 (1982).
110. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 3.
111. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 105, at 5.
112. 606 F.2d at 34.
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CONCLUSION

In light of Congress' passage of the Ethics in Government
Act and the ABA's failure to justify DR9-101(B) under the standard of avoiding "the appearance of impropriety," the bar needs
to adopt a clear conflict-of-interest ethical precept to regulate
the private practice of former government attorneys. The vague
standard of "appearance of professional impropriety" should not
govern the private practice of former government lawyers. Nor
should that standard serve to impute the disqualification of a
former government attorney to an entire law firm when there is
no evidence of actual impropriety. The bar should articulate
with precision conflicts of interest. Proposed Rule 1.11 clearly
establishes for the individual lawyer what will constitute unethical activity relating to post-government employment. The entry
of government attorneys into private practice has become an occurrence of significant magnitude to warrant the bar's and federal courts' recognition of its facility unfettered by an out-dated
and unrealistic ethical standard incomprehensible to lawyers.
MRPC Rule 1.11 fulfills the Kutak Commission's goals to
identify clearly the ABA's ethical objectives in the practice of
law that guided the drafting of the Model Rules. Rule 1.11 is
comprehensible, consistent with other rules in the proposed
Model Rules, and compatible with current law. The rule is
drafted clearly to prescribe the disqualification of an individual
lawyer and a firm when the former government lawyer's disqualification is imputed to that firm. The rule extols the ethical principles of client confidentiality which are upheld consistently in
the MRPC. Rule 1.11 is also consistent with the MCPR's disciplinary rules and Opinion 342's rejection of the appearance of
impropriety as a standard, test or element embodied in the disqualification of revolving door lawyers. It parallels federal law
and regulation and, therefore, is congruent with the federal system. Moreover, Rule 1.11 provides for a firm's disqualification,
an issue Congress reserved for regulation by the bar itself.
The most compelling reason for adoption of Rule 1.11 is its
elimination of the "appearance of professional impropriety" governing the practice of former government lawyers. Removal of
this vague and arbitrary standard will allow lawyers to pass
through the revolving door with reasonable certainty of proscribed conduct which could result in personal or firm disqualifi-
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cation. The proposed Rule 1.11 preserves the highest ethical
standards of confidentiality and loyalty to a client or former client. Its provisions embody the policy considerations of the government's need to employ qualified attorneys who are not penalized professionally and financially when they exit the revolving
door to private practice. Adoption of Rule 1.11 will be an efficacious reform to the body of ethics governing the employment of
former government lawyers.
Barbara G. Mance*

• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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